Chauncey Stillman Distinguished Professor of Practical Ethics
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He has secondary appointments in the Law School and the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, and he is core faculty in the Duke Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, the Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, and the Duke Center for Interdisciplinary Decision Sciences. He serves as Resource Faculty in the Philosophy Department of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Partner Investigator at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, and Research Scientist with The Mind Research Network in New Mexico. He has visited at National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan, the Macquarie Research Center for Agency, Values, and Ethics in Australia, and the National Institutes of Health in Washington. He has received fellowships from the Harvard Program in Ethics and the Professions, the Princeton Center for Human Values, the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, the Center for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the Australian National University, and the Sage Center for the Study of the Mind at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He has served as co-chair of the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association, co-director of the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project, and co-PI of the project on the Neuroscience and Philosophy of Free Will and Moral Responsibility at Chapman University. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Amherst College and his doctorate from Yale University. He has published widely on ethics (theoretical and applied as well as meta-ethics), empirical moral psychology and neuroscience, philosophy of law, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and informal logic. Most recently, he is the author of Think Again: How to Reason and Argue, Morality Without God?, and Moral Skepticisms; co-author with Robert Fogelin of Understanding Arguments, Ninth Edition, and with Jesse Summers of Clean Hands: Philosophical Lessons of Scrupulosity; and editor of Moral Psychology, volumes I-V. His numerous articles have appeared in a variety of philosophical, scientific, and popular journals and collections. He performs various experiments in moral psychology and brain science with his Moral Attitudes and Decisions (MAD) Lab. He is working on one book on moral artificial intelligence and another book that will develop a contrastivist view of freedom and responsibility. He co-directs Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNaP) with Felipe De Brigard and teaches a popular MOOC, Think Again, on the Coursera website with Ram Neta.
The Evolution of Comity: An Interdiscilinary Exploration of the Nature, Developmental Origins and Future of Shared Humanity awarded by John Templeton Foundation (Co-Principal Investigator). 2022 to 2025
Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy awarded by Templeton World Charity Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2020 to 2023
The Development of Intellectual Humility (Pilot Grants) awarded by John Templeton Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2021 to 2022
How Stories Inspire Virtuous Behavior awarded by Yale University (Principal Investigator). 2019 to 2022
The Development of Intellectual Humility (Virtual Research Network) awarded by John Templeton Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2021
Book Funding: "Free Will? Questions and Answers from Neuroscientists and Philosophers" awarded by Chapman University (Principal Investigator). 2019 to 2020
Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNAP) awarded by John Templeton Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2016 to 2020
How to Build Ethics into Robust Artificial Intelligence awarded by Future of Life Institute (Co-Principal Investigator). 2015 to 2018
MAD Lab (Moral Attitudes and Decisions Laboratory) awarded by New Hampshire Charitable Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2016
- Book Reviews
- Book Sections
- Journal Articles
- Journal Issues
- Conference Papers
- Digital Publications
Ancell, A., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, editors. Moral Disagreements. LuLu Press, 2015.
Summers, J., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, editors. Drugs and Addiction. Lulu Press, 2015.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Moral psychology, volume 4: Free will and moral responsibility. 2014, pp. 1–474.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Robert J. Fogelin. Understanding Arguments, Ninth Edition, Complete Version. Cengage, 2014.
Nadel, L., and W. P. Sinnott-Armstrong. Introduction: Memory in the Legal Context. 2013.
Nadel, L., and W. P. Sinnott-Armstrong. Preface. 2013.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., and S. Sullivan, editors. The Ethics of War and Terrorism. Lulu Press, 2013.
Kiehl, K., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, editors. Oxford Handbook of Psychopathy and Law. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Why We LaughInside Jokes Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mindby Matthew M. Hurley, Daniel C. Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams Jr. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011. 373 pp. $29.95, £22.95. ISBN 9780262015820.” Science, vol. 332, no. 6035, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 10 June 2011, pp. 1265–1265. Crossref, doi:10.1126/science.1206802. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Adina Roskies. “Alfred R. Mele’s Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will.” Philosophical Books, vol. 51, 2010, pp. 127–43.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Responsibility and fault.” Law and Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 1, KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBL, 1 Jan. 2001, pp. 103–06.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Value judgment: Improving our ethical beliefs.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 60, no. 1, Jan. 2000, pp. 237–40.
Sinnott‐Armstrong, Walter. “Book ReviewRuth Chang, , ed.Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. ix+303. $57.50 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).” Ethics, vol. 110, no. 1, University of Chicago Press, Oct. 1999, pp. 190–92. Crossref, doi:10.1086/233210. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 2, Springer Verlag (Germany), 1999, pp. 191–93.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Morality, Normativity, and Society.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 105, no. 4, Oct. 1996, pp. 552–54.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Morality and Action.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 1996, pp. 193–96.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “The Structure of Justification.” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 180, Wiley: 24 months, July 1995, pp. 394–97.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Moral Imagination.” Mind, vol. 103, no. 411, Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option G, July 1994, pp. 381–84.
Henne, P., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “Does neuroscience undermine morality?” Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, 2018, pp. 54–67. Scopus, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Introduction.” Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Freedom and Responsibility, MIT Press, 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Introduction. 2014, pp. xiii–xviii.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Do Psychopaths Refute Internalism?” Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity, edited by Thomas Schramme, MIT Press, 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Moral Disagreements with Psychopaths.” Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, edited by Michael Bergmann, Oxford University Press, 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Adina Roskies. “Introduction to Neuroscience and Society.” The Cognitive Neurosciences V, edited by Michael Gazzaniga and Ronald Mangum, MIT Press, 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Are Addicts Responsible?” Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience, edited by Neil Levy, Oxford University Press, 2014.
Strohminger, N., et al. “Implicit Moral Attitudes.” Experimental Ethics: Towards an Empirical Moral Philosophy, edited by C. Luetage et al., Macmillan, 2014, pp. 133–56.
Simmons, Claire, et al. “Freedom from what? Separating lay concepts of freedom.” Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 101, May 2022, p. 103318. Epmc, doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103318. Full Text
Chan, Lok, et al. “Which features of patients are morally relevant in ventilator triage? A survey of the UK public.” Bmc Medical Ethics, vol. 23, no. 1, Mar. 2022, p. 33. Epmc, doi:10.1186/s12910-022-00773-0. Full Text
Niso, Guiomar, et al. “Good Scientific Practice in MEEG Research: Progress and Perspectives.” Neuroimage, Mar. 2022, p. 119056. Epmc, doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2022.119056. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Claire Simmons. “Some common fallacies in arguments from M/EEG data.” Neuroimage, vol. 245, Dec. 2021, p. 118725. Epmc, doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118725. Full Text
Everett, Jim A. C., et al. “Moral dilemmas and trust in leaders during a global health crisis.” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 5, no. 8, Aug. 2021, pp. 1074–88. Epmc, doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01156-y. Full Text
McDonald, Kelsey, et al. “Valence framing effects on moral judgments: A meta-analysis.” Cognition, vol. 212, July 2021, p. 104703. Epmc, doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104703. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Special Issue: Pardo and Patterson on Neuroscience and the Law.” Neuroethics, vol. 4, 2011, pp. 179–222.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Section B: Ethics.” Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, Philosophical Issues, vol. 18, 2008, pp. 143–293.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., and F. Schauer. “Introduction.” Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 3, 2008, pp. 251–52.
. C. “Evidence and Law.” Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy, edited by W. Sinnott-Armstrong and F. Schauer, vol. 5, no. 3, 2008.
. F. “Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation.” Boston University Law Review. Boston University. School of Law, edited by S. Brison and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, vol. 72, no. 4, The Boston University School of Law, Sept. 1992, pp. 681–799.
McElfresh, Duncan C., et al. “Indecision Modeling.” Aaai, AAAI Press, 2021, pp. 5975–83.
Chan, Lok, et al. “Artificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making.” Aies, edited by Annette N. Markham et al., ACM, 2020, pp. 214–20.
Kramer, M. F., et al. “When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?” Aies 2018 Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society, 2018, pp. 204–09. Scopus, doi:10.1145/3278721.3278752. Full Text
Freedman, Rachel, et al. “Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human Values.” Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society, ACM, 2018. Crossref, doi:10.1145/3278721.3278727. Full Text
Freedman, R., et al. “Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values.” 32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2018, 2018, pp. 1636–43.
Conitzer, V., et al. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2018, 2018.
Conitzer, V., et al. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” Aaai Workshop Technical Report, vol. WS-17-01-WS-17-15, 2017, pp. 105–09.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Explanation and justification in moral epistemology.” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol 1, edited by K. Brinkmann, PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CTR, 1999, pp. 117–27.
Conitzer, V., et al. Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. My Brain Made Me Do It — So What? Oxford Uehiro Center for Practical Ethics, Mar. 2015.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Does Philosophy Matter? Oxford University Press blog, Mar. 2015.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. My Brain Made Me Do It, but Does that Matter? The Conversation, Dec. 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Moral Skepticism. Standford University, 2004.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Consequentialism. Stanford University, 2003.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Does Neuroscience Undermine Free Will? Slate.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Intentions and Consequences in the Modern World. The Center for Humans & Nature, John Templeton Foundation.
Roskies, A., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Thinking about Morality.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. What is Philosophy? Dartmouth.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Induction vs. Deduction. Dartmouth.